



Almost from its inception, the Constitution enjoyed a measure of
prestige and respect unique in world history.' This enthusiasm for
the Constitution was replaced by immense cynicism upon the publi-
cation of Charles Beard's famous and enormously influential2 book,
* Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. B.A. 1977, Harvard Univer-
sity; J.D. 1982, Yale Law School. I am grateful for conversations with James M.
Buchanan, of the Center for Study of Public Choice, and Steven H. Shiffrin, of Cornell
Law School, both of whom provided useful suggestions. Robert McDonough, of Cornell
Law School, provided valuable research assistance.
I. See Kristol, "The Spirit of '87'" PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1987, at 3-4. Writes
Kristol:
"Veneration" is not too strong a term, at least so far as popular opinion is
concerned.... This condition has endured almost from the very beginnings
of the nation. Though, as we know, the opposition to ratification of the Con-
stitution was widespread and heated, within a decade such sentiments had
evaporated. What that distinguished constitutional scholar, E. S. Corwin,
has called (contemptuously) a "cult of the Constitution" quickly made its
appearance. Such terms as "glorious," even "sacred," became the conven-
tional cliches.... When, in 1878, Gladstone made his much-quoted tribute
("the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and
purpose of man"), it was immediately accepted as fair and appropriate
comment.
Id.
2. See F. McDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTrru-
TION 4 (1958) ("No other work on the making or the nature of the Constitution has been
so much debated, so widely known, and ultimately so widely accepted."); see also A.
BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 29 (1987) ("What began in Charles
Beard's Marxism ... became routine. We are used to hearing the Founders charged
with being racists, murderers of Indians, representatives of class interests.").
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An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States,3 -which
provides the focus for this issue of the George Washington Law Review.
Beard's work "came as a revelation to scholars and intellectuals
who hailed it for undermining the patriotic banalities of nineteenth-
century historiography." 4 Only recently have we emerged from the
"grave doubts and bitter and violent denunciations of our national
purpose" 5 that Beard's constitutional analysis brought upon us.
But, just as the more optimistic approach to our constitutional
heritage seemed finally to have reasserted itself, a new and more
sophisticated economic interpretation of the Constitution - this
time from the law and economics movement - has emerged to chal-
lenge the conventional wisdom once again.6 In this Article I wish to
challenge the view of the law and economics movement that the
Constitution serves to facilitate rather than to retard
countermajoritarian wealth transfers desired by special interest
groups. In challenging the current perspective, however, I wish to
affirm the general validity of using economic models to address con-
stitutional theory by employing a standard, neo-classical economic
analysis to justify the respect that the Constitution has enjoyed
throughout most of its history. Thus, while I believe that the eco-
nomic approach to constitutional analysis is the right approach, I
wish to suggest that proper application of the model generates a far
different vision of the Constitution than is currently seen.
The United States Constitution is not only an economic docu-
ment, it is the first public-regarding economic constitution in world
history, and its economic underpinning is the source of its success.7
As indicated above, not all of those who have examined the Consti-
tution in economic terms have taken such a benign view of the docu-
ment. Specifically, a "progressive" or Marxian s strain of economic
interpretation, founded on the important early work of Charles
3. C. BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (1913).
4. Diggins, Power andAuthority inAmerican History: The Case of CharlesA. Beard and His
Critics, 86 Am. HIST. REV. 701, 702 (1981).
5. Lavine, John Dewey and the Founders: Human Nature and Politics, 3 WORKS & DAYS
53, 53 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Grain & Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group Theony of Govern-
ment, 8J. LEGAL SrUD. 555 (1979); Crain & Tollison, Constitutional Change in an hIterest-
Group Perspective, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1979); Landes & Posner, The IndependentJudiciauy
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18J.L. & EcoN. 875 (1975).
7. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutoiy Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 228 n.29 (1986) (discussing the meaning of
"public regarding").
8. I use the term "Marxian" here to refer to thbse scholars who view historical
events (such as the drafting of the American Constitution) as the inevitable consequence
of economic factors and class relationships. Apparently, it was not until the 1950s that
Beard's work (and that of his followers) generally came to be identified with Marxism.
See Diggins, supra note 4, at 702 ("Time finally ripened in the 1950s, when Beardianism
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Beard, espouses the view that the Constitution structured govern-
ment to facilitate the retention of wealth by, and the transfer of
wealth to, a small minority of men concerned primarily with their
immediate property interests. 9 Despite its glaring errors,10 Beard's
work is important if for no other reason than that it takes a self-
consciously economic approach to the Constitution. Indeed, the cul-
mination of Beard's thesis is that the Constitution was "an economic
document drawn with superb skill by men whose property interests
were immediately at stake."11  Although I strongly disagree with
Beard's normative conclusions about the nature of the economic
outcomes that the Constitution is designed to generate, and I share
the skepticism of many about the validity of his historical analysis,
his core premises about the features that cause a constitution to be
an economic document are precisely the same as mine.
Predictably, those academics applying economic principles to
legal problems (i.e., proponents of the law and economics move-
ment) also take a decidedly economic approach to the Constitu-
tion.12 Although the approach to the Constitution taken by those in
the law and economics movement is far more sophisticated and rig-
orous in its use of models than the approach taken by the Marxists,
at the core their theories are identical. Like the Marxists, law and
economics theorists view the Constitution as a forum for the expres-
sion of a political equilibrium among competing, powerful special
interest groups. According to the theory, these special interest
groups place an especially high value on constitutional rules, be-
cause such rules are harder to repeal and therefore more durable
than ordinary legislation. 13
It is worth taking notice when two groups with such starkly diver-
gent views are in agreement about something as important as their
view of the Constitution. At the core of both theories lies what I
consider to be a peculiar view of the separation of powers. Both
became almost synonymous with Marxism . ); see also A. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 29,
56 (describing Beard as a Marxist).
If Beard was himself a Marxist, he was a closet Marxist. See Adair, The Tenth Federalist
Revisited, 8 WM. & MARY 0. 48, 61 (1951); Lerner, Beards Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution, in BooKs THAT CHANGED OUR MINDS 153-54 (M. Cowley & B. Smith eds.
1938). For a self-consciously Marxist analysis of the Constitution, see H. GER-
STENBERGER, ZUR POLITISCHEN OKONOMIE DER BURGERLICHEN GESELLSCHAFr: DIE HIS-
TORISCHEN BEDINGUNGEN IHRER KONSTrrUTIoN IN DEN USA (1973).
It is even less accurate to consider Beard a progressive than it is to consider him a
Marxist. His work is vastly different than that of such progressives asJohn Dewey, Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes, and Thorstein Veblen.
9. In Beard's view, the Constitution was enacted because "[l]arge and important
groups of economic interests were adversely affected by the system of government
under the Articles of Confederation, namely, those of public securities, shipping and
manufacturing, money at interest; in short, capital as opposed to land." C. BEARD, supra
note 3, at 63.
10. See F. McDoNALD, supra note 2, at 349-57 (finding that key propositions of
Beard's economic interpretation are incompatible with the facts).
11. C. BEARD, supra note 3, at 188.
12. For a list of the seminal works in the growing movement to apply economic
principles to constitutional issues, see supra note 6.
13. See Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation 14 (manuscript to be published in 74
VA. L. REV. (1988)) (copy on file at the George Washington Law Review).
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Beard and the economists view the separation of powers, like the
system of checks and balances, of which it is a part, as a vehicle
designed by the Framers to effectuate interest group domination of
daily political life. This, it seems to me, is the central flaw in their
analysis. The separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances thwart rather than facilitate the political effectiveness of
special interest group coalitions.
Thus both sides agree that the Constitution is in fact a profoundly
economic document and that the separation of powers is the central
feature that causes the Constitution to merit this description. This
point seems obvious, but it long has been ignored by constitutional
law scholars ignorant of the rudiments of public choice. 14 Disagree-
ment comes over the question of the precise economic function that
the separation of powers is supposed to have in the constitutional
system. It is here that I part ways with both the Beardians and the
current paradigm in the law and economics literature.
As will be seen, a great deal turns on this question. If the Beardi-
ans and the law and economics adherents are correct, then the Con-
stitution is an exploitive creation designed to effectuate needless
and destructive wealth transfers. If they are right, the Constitution
is not a "good thing" and cannot be defended from a normative
standpoint. Indeed, their analysis presumably implies that we would
all be better off if the Constitution had never been enacted in the
first place. In place of their approach to the Constitution, I offer an
alternative, also based on economic analysis, which posits that the
Constitution is a public-regarding document expressly designed to
impede the welfare-reducing wealth transfers described above. Fur-
ther, the separation of powers is one of the principal mechanisms
used by the Constitution to prevent such transfers from taking
place. But, like the others who view the Constitution from an eco-
nomic perspective, I am firmly of the view that economic incentives
rather than altruism caused the Constitution to take the shape it has.
In part, the purpose of this Article is to define what it means to
discuss a constitution as an economic document. Toward this end,
Section I of the Article sets up the rules of the game by articulating
the model that drives all economic approaches to constitutional in-
terpretation and shows how the model was embraced by the Fram-
ers. Section II describes in more detail the specifics of both the
Beardian approach and the law and economics approach to the Con-
stitution. These descriptions should provide a clear image of what it
means to think of the Constitution as an economic document.
14. The notable exceptions are Cass Sunstein and Bruce Ackerman. See Ackerman,
The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE LJ. 1013, 1028-29, 1040-43
(1984); Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUm. L. REv. 1689, 1732
(1984).
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Finally, after describing what I believe to be the flaws in the ex-
isting economic approaches, the last Section of the Article sets forth
my own economic interpretation of the Constitution. As will be
seen, there is much to be gained by using an economic model to
evaluate the Constitution. Indeed, I argue that the Constitution is a
profoundly economic document in the most fundamental sense and
therefore must be evaluated from an economic perspective. The
flaw in the current approaches is not in their use of an economic
model, but in their application of that model.
I. The Constitution from an Economic Perspective
To say that the Constitution was written from an economic per-
spective is saying a lot. It means that the drafters of that document
made the same assumptions and used the same basic model as econ-
omists. In particular, it means that the Framers made the same
three simple but important assumptions about human nature that
economists make. These common assumptions make it possible to
argue that the Constitution is an economic document.
A. The Assumptions of the Economic Model
The three basic assumptions of the economic model are well
known and need only be summarized here: (1) people can be ex-
pected to act self-interestedly; (2) when pursuing their own self-
interest, people respond to incentives in a predictable fashion; and
(3) in pursuing their own self-interest, people, by engaging in volun-
tary exchange, can benefit not only themselves but society because
such voluntary exchange drives resources to their most highly val-
ued uses.1 5
The "prevailing opinion" among economists in the late 1700s was
that in market transactions "one party profits at the expense of the
other."1 6 But Adam Smith changed that paradigm by showing that
voluntary exchanges by definition benefit both parties to the trans-
action, because only the prospect of gain provides the necessary in-
centive to consummate the exchange.
Adam Smith also introduced the notion that self-interested eco-
nomic actors engaging in consensual, mutually beneficial market
transactions are given incentives to produce more and thereby ben-
efit society as a whole. In Smith's view, competition among produ-
cers would keep prices low and output high, thus benefiting
consumers as well as producers. 17
Smith's classic statement of the principles of economics, The
Wealth of Nations, was published in 1776 just prior to the Constitu-
tional Convention in Philadelphia. Smith's work provided the view
15. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-10 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the
nature of economic reasoning in somewhat more detail).
16. R. MCKENZIE, ECONOMICS 8 (1986); see also E.G. WE-ST, ADAM SMrrH: THE MAN
AND HIS WORKS 15 (1976).
17. See A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 381-84 (E. Cannan rev. ed. 1976) (1776).
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of human nature that was the guiding vision for the Framers. His
ideas exposed the possibilities for structuring a government that al-
lowed the rational self-interest of the citizenry to act like an "invisi-
ble hand," through which individual economic actors facilitate the
common good by pursuing their own goals.18
It must be emphasized at the outset that to adopt an economic
model for drafting a constitution does not require that the Framers
embraced the assumptions that drive the model. The purpose of
assumptions in social science methodology is to construct a model
that will be useful in predicting real world outcomes.1 9 In other
words, the value of a model lies not in the accuracy of its assump-
tions, but in its success in predicting outcomes. 20 Thus to say that
the Framers employed the economic assumption of self-interested-
ness does not mean that the Framers were of the view that people
place their own, selfish goals above those of the society as a whole in
all contexts and situations. Rather, it means simply that the Framers
were of the view that they could draft a better constitution by mak-
ing the assumption that self-interestedness would be the dominant
motivating force in human nature often enough so that their failure
to embrace the assumption would have disastrous effects on post-
constitutional America. In other words, the way to invoke the as-
sumptions of economics to produce a successful constitution is to
draft a document that deals with the way that men generally behave
rather than the way that men always behave.
B. The Assumptions of the Framers
As Martin Diamond has pointed out, the perspectives on and as-
sumptions about constitutional law that informed the Framers find
their most complete expression in James Madison's Federalist No.
10,21 in which Madison addressed the problem of factions. 22 Here
Madison expressly embraced the notion that what would separate
his constitution from those that had gone before it would be a more
realistic conception of human nature. This conception of human
18. See R. MCKENZIE, supra note 16, at 8-9.
19. See M. FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN PosmvE Eco-
NOMICS 3 (1953).
20. Because the true test of a theory lies in "its utility in predicting or explaining
reality," economic theory is clearly a success as a social science. See R. POSNER, supra
note 15, at 13.
Indeed, the lack of reality in some of the assumptions of economic theory may be a
sign of strength rather than weakness. The purpose of assumptions in economic model-
ing is to simplify a world that is far too complex and qonfused to be modeled without
making such assumptions. For any given level of predictive power, the simpler the as-
sumptions of a model, the better the model. See id.
21. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56, 56-57 (J. Madison) (I. Cooke ed. 1961).
22. Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS Or
THE AMERICAN REPuBLIC 39, 48 (R. Horwitz 2d ed. 1979).
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nature is precisely the same as the conception of human nature that
drives economic theory. From this starting point, the Constitution
became an economic document.
The problem confronting the Framers was that, on the one hand,
they did not want to organize another monarchy, but on the other
hand, the earlier democracies had all been abject failures, nothing
less than "spectacles of turbulence and contention." 23 Madison's
view was that the problem with previous democracies had lain in the
assumptions made by their organizers. Specifically, prior to the
Federalists' construction of our political regime, "the whole of polit-
ical thought had turned on ways to inculcate virtue in a small class
that would govern." 24 In stark contrast, the government that
Madison had in mind (and the one that ultimately emerged) would
be based on the assumption that the postconstitutional world would
be populated by people motivated by self-interest rather than by
virtue.25
The Framers took the view that the only way to work out effective
solutions to the problems posed by people pursuing self-interested
political solutions to their economic problems was to structure the
government so as to channel people's self-interest in socially pro-
ductive directions. 26 Reliance on virtue had been tried in the past
and consistently had met with failure. The same incentives that lead
people to maximize societal wealth in consensual market transac-
tions lead people, acting through organized special interest groups,
to attempt to effectuate wealth transfers through legislation that
dramatically reduces overall societal welfare. Recognizing this
problem, the Framers attempted to construct a constitutional re-
gime that would direct human endeavor away from the political
sphere and towards the domain of private ordering. They accom-
plished this by raising the transaction costs facing interest groups
who attempt to acquire wealth through legislative transfers rather
than through consensual market transactions.
Thus the Framers of the Constitution began with the same prem-
ise of self-interestedness upon which economic theory is based.
Everyone who takes an economic approach to constitutional theory
(and many who do not) agrees on this point. There is also general
agreement on precisely how this self-interest manifests itself. The
disagreement comes in assessing just how the Framers chose to
channel that self-interest.
The self-interest of citizens in postconstitutional politics manifests
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 21, at 61.
24. Moynihan, The "New Science of Politics" and the Old Arl of Government, PUB. INTER-
EST, Winter 1987. at 22, 23.
25. See Kristol, supra note I, at 3 (stating that the American Constitution "reveals
what one would call a 'realistic' view of human nature - i.e., a view that is more alert to
the absence of human virtues than to their presence").
26. See Malbin, Factions and Itcentives in Congress, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1987, at 91,
92 (stating that "the Framers believed most voters in a liberal democracy would be con-
cerned primarily with their immediate well-being and would try to turn the government
toward serving it").
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itself in the form of factions or special interest groups whose goal is
to effectuate wealth transfers to themselves from the population as a
whole. Another distinctive feature of the United States Constitution
is that it is the first constitution in world history designed expressly
to confront the problems of faction or interest group opportu-
nism. 27 Such a recognition was an inevitable implication of the
Framers' presumption of self-interestedness and their application of
economic reasoning to the task of constitutional creation.
Uniting the Beardians and the proponents of law and economics
is their view of how the Framers dealt with the inevitable emergence
of factions in postconstitutional political life. Their view is that the
Constitution sought to facilitate rather than to impede the success
of such groups. 28 In my view, however, the Framers intended to
raise rather than lower the cost to interest groups of achieving their
goals. In so doing, the Framers were able to direct the self-inter-
ested behavior of individuals towards the marketplace and away
from the political forum.
The Framers attempted to guide transactions away from the polit-
ical forum and towards the marketplace because the same invisible
hand that leads to wealth creation in private market transactions
causes massive economic inefficiencies and social instability when it
is set loose on the political sphere.29 This difference is due to the
crucial distinction between government-induced 'transactions and
market-induced transactions. The element of mutual voluntariness
that is present in market transactions is conspicuously absent from
transactions (such as taxation and regulation) compelled by the gov-
ernment. As a consequence of the government's ability to coerce,
rational, self-interested citizens have incentives to organize into spe-
cial interest group coalitions in order to demand regulation that
makes them better off. And, generally speaking, the regulation that
makes them better off does so by transferring the wealth of others to
them, rather than by creating new wealth, as in the case of market
transactions.3 0
These wealth transfers take many forms. Government can create
cartels of private producers;3' it can regulate so as to impose higher
27. See Sunstein, supra note 14 passini.
28. See iira text accompanying notes 40-51 (describing Beard's view); infra text ac-
companying notes 51-92 (describing the law and economics movement's view of the
Constitution).
29. See M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWlTH, STAG-
FLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDIrES 36-74 (1982).
30. See Migu&, Controls ersus Subsidies in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 20 J.L. &
EcoN. 213, 214 (1977) (stating that "[r]egulation is ... an instrument of wealth transfer
- the extent of which is determined in a political market - where interest groups de-
mand regulation and politician-regulators supply it").
31. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGrr. Sci. 3, 3-7
(1971).
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costs on one segment of an industry than another;32 or it simply can
transfer wealth outright from one group to another through the ve-
hicle of taxation.33 Successful distributional coalitions are those
that are small in relation to the society as a whole and thus are able
to overcome the organizational problems that inevitably plague in-
terest group transfer activity.3 4 As a result, successful politicians are
the ones who can identify issues with distinct, readily identifiable
winners and diverse, disorganized, hard-to-identify losers.35 Polit-
ical success comes from enacting laws that transfer wealth from the
losers to the winners because doing so provides politicians with net
gains in political support.
Because successful distributional coalitions must be small relative
to the population as a whole in order to succeed, they are inherently
anti-democratic. They are also extremely costly to society in a vari-
ety of subtle and not-so-subtle ways. The resources expended in
seeking favorable government regulation and avoiding unfavorable
government regulation impose a high opportunity cost on society
because these are resources that could be allocated to productive
uses.36 In addition, once regulations are in place, compliance with
them is costly. Finally, regulatory wealth transfer creates allocative
inefficiencies by diverting resources to less valuable but unregulated
uses.3 7 It is misleading, however, to think of the problems posed by
factions and interest groups as merely economic problems. As
Douglass North has observed, the persistent tension between the
organizational structure of a government that maximizes the income
of its ruler (and his supporters) and an efficient system that reduces
transaction costs and encourages economic growth is the "root
cause of the failure of societies to experience sustained economic
32. See McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regula-
tion, 16J. LEGAL SmD. 101, 104 (1987).
33. It might seem that all interest groups would prefer wealth transfers to come in
the form ofdirect, lump-sum cash subsidies, but this is not the case. As Professor Stigler
has shown, only when the elasticity of supply in an industry or interest group is small will
the industry prefer cash to controls over entry or output. This is because cash subsidies
must be shared with new entrants to the group or industry and thus quickly will be
dissipated by new entry. By contrast, controls over entry or output provide economic
rents to an interest group that cannot be competed away by such new entry. See G.
STICLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 115 (1975).
34. See M. OLSON, supra note 29, at 41-47. The most notable problem facing interest
groups is the notorious "free-rider" problem. Interest groups provide a public good for
the members of the group. As such, each member of the group is in the same position
vis-A-vis the group as an ordinary citizen is vis-a-vis society as a whole. There is little
incentive for individual group members to expend resources to obtain wealth transfers
when such transfers must be shared by all members of the group. Instead, each group
member has an incentive to understate his preference for the good in the hope that
others in the group will expend the resources to obtain the good.
35. R. MCCORMICK & R. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GRouP THEORY OF GOVERNMENT 17 (1982).
36. See Alm, The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy, 23 ECON. INQJUIRY 243
(1985); Fisher, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation: Posner Reconsidered, 93 J. POL.
EcoN. 410 (1985); Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83J. POL. ECON. 807
(1975); Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
37. McChesney, supra note 32, at 118.
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growth."' 38 Because of its tendency to distort incentives to create
wealth, this interest group rent-seeking activity even has been used
to explain the decline and collapse of the great civilizations of the
West.39
The law and economics proponents, along with Professor Beard
and his followers, take the position that the Framers recognized the
nature of the interest group problem but nonetheless did nothing to
deter the operation of interest groups within the new republic.
Rather, both sides maintain that the Framers, for reasons of their
own, designed the Constitution so as to facilitate interest group
activities.
I. The Current Economic Approaches
The analysis to this point has led up to the question whether the
Framers were attempting to control or facilitate interest group be-
havior in their construction of the Constitution. The answer to this
question lies in an examination of the incentives that the Framers
themselves were facing as they convened in Philadelphia in 1776 to
devise the new Constitution. The Marxist/progressive approach and
the law and economics approach both argue that the Framers were
inclined to facilitate interest group activities, presumably because
doing so served their own, selfish ends, while designing a constitu-
tion that would constrain interest group activity would not.
A. The Beardian Approach
The particular special interest groups that Charles Beard argued
the Constitution was designed to benefit were capitalist interests,
namely those of manufacturers and bankers at the expense of farm-
ers and debtors. According to Beard, the new Constitution con-
ferred four important powers on the new federal government: the
power to tax, the power to conduct war, the power to control com-
merce, and the power to dispose of the western lands.40 These pow-
ers benefited manufacturers by facilitating the protective tariff; they
benefited bankers by blocking "'the renewed attempts of "desper-
ate debtors" like Shays'" and by providing for ample revenues for
the payment of their claims. 4 1
In Beard's view, small farmers were harmed by the Constitution
because it established a central government with sufficient power to
quash any armed agrarian rebellion against the evil land barons.
38. North, A Framework for Analyzing the State hi Economic Histoiy. 16 EXPLORATIONS
ECON. HiST. 249, 253 (1979); see also M. OLSoN, supra note 29, at 19-21.
39. See M. OLsoN, supra note 29, at 1.
40. C. BEARD, supra note 3, at 176.
41. See F. MCDONALD, supra note 2, at 5 (quoting C. BEARD, supra note 3, at 171).
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Debtors were harmed because the new Constitution prevented large
numbers of debtors from seeking relief from their creditors through
the state legislature. Specifically, they were prevented from exerting
political pressure on state legislatures to deflate the value of the
debtors' outstanding obligations by permitting the repayment of
such obligations in worthless paper currency issued by the states.
Likewise, the constitutional prohibition forbidding the states from
impairing contractual obligations was seen by Beard as a means to
benefit creditors at the expense of debtors.42
Thus to Beard the Constitution is a purely economic document in
the sense that it reflects the outcome of a concerted struggle for
political power among competing interest groups who have organ-
ized to advance the narrow economic interests of their members.
According to Beard, "[i]n the ratification, it became manifest that
the line of cleavage for and against the Constitution was between
substantial personalty interests on the one hand and the small farm-
ing and debtor interests on the other."' 43 As will be seen, this vision
of the Constitution as a forum for competition among discrete eco-
nomic interests is a simplistic version of the constitutional vision
embraced by those interested in law and economics who have
turned their attention to constitutional theory.44
In Beard's view, the "keystone of the whole structure" of the Con-
stitution was the separation of powers, particularly the establish-
ment of an independent judiciary. 45 In his words:
If we examine carefully the delicate instrument by which the fram-
ers sought to check certain kinds of positive action that might be
advocated to the detriment of established and acquired rights, we
cannot help marvelling at their skill. Their leading idea was to
break up the attacking forces at the starting point: the source of
political authority for the several branches of the government.
This disintegration of positive action at the source was further fa-
cilitated by the differentiation in the terms given to the respective
departments of the government.46
The power of the third branch, in particular its ability to declare acts
of Congress unconstitutional, was seen by Beard as the primary bul-
wark of the capitalists against encroachment by subsequent legisla-
tures bent on altering the structure of society.47
Other aspects of the system of checks and balances, especially the
bicameral legislature and the executive veto, also enforce the status
quo in Beard's view.48 By providing for staggered terms of office
(members of the House of Representatives are elected to serve two-
year terms, members of the Senate to six-year terms, and the Presi-
dent to four-year terms) the Framers, according to Beard, were able
42. See C. BEARD, supra note 3, at 154-79, 290-91, 325.
43. Id. at 325.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 51-92.
45. C. BEARD, supra note 3, at 162.
46. Id. at 161.
47. See id. at 163-64.
48. See id. at 162.
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to protect the winners of the constitutional wealth transfer game
against future encroachments by democratic processes.49 Beard be-
lieved that if there were a sudden change in the political climate in
the country, that change could not manifest itself in the political
sphere for several years due to the staggered nature of the terms of
office of the elected representatives. In other words, the separation
of powers not only prevented "popular distempers" from "working
their havoc through direct elections;" it also imposed "the require-
ment that they must last six years in order to make their effects felt
in the political department of the government, providing they can
break through the barriers imposed by the indirect election of the
Senate and the President." 50
Because so much of Beard's important book is devoted to his now
largely discredited description of the precise economic interests of
the Framers and his reasons for why these interests are relevant,
Beard's explanation of the mechanics by which he thought the Con-
stitution furthered those interests easily can be lost. Yet those
mechanics are what interest us here. The restrictions against state
government interference with contractual obligations, and the struc-
ture of the separation of powers, especially the power of the in-
dependent judiciary, were seen as the devices through which
Beard's self-interested Framers accomplished their economic goals.
These features, in Beard's view, made the Constitution a profoundly
economic document.
B. The Law and Economics Movement's Approach to the Constitution
Just as Beard regarded the Constitution as the triumph of a small
number of special interest groups over the popular will,51 those law
and economics scholars working in this field view the Constitution
as the triumph of special interest politics over majoritarian out-
comes. And, like Beard, those applying economic principles to legal
analysis consider the system of checks and balances in general, and
the separation of powers in particular, as the centerpiece of the eco-
nomic Constitution.
The law and economics approach to the Constitution is at once
more sophisticated and more superficial than the Beardian ap-
proach. More sophisticated in that it employs formal modeling
techniques to study the legislative process and uses empirical analy-
sis to validate its hypotheses. More superficial in that it does not
49. ML
50. Id.
51. To use Bruce Ackerman's colorful phraseology, "[i]n Beard's familiar view, the
Framers' masquerade in the name of the 'People' is nothing but a badjoke." Ackerman,
supra note 14, at 1015.
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attempt, as Beard did, to describe fully the precise nature of the
economic incentives facing the Framers.
Where Beard simply looked at the economic self-interest of the
Framers as a source of information about their incentives, the econ-
omists, applying microeconomic principles, view the lawmaking pro-
cess as a market in which legal rules go to the individual or group
that values them the most, as measured by its willingness and ability
to pay.5 2 The currency used for payment comes in the form of polit-
ical support for politicians, bureaucrats, and other political actors
who "essentially act like brokers in a private context - they pair
demanders and suppliers of legislation."-53
The key difference between the market for legislation and other
markets is that the legislatively coerced suppliers of interest group
bargains generally are unwilling (and often unknowing) participants
in the process. Organized interest groups that successfully mount
lobbying campaigns to obtain passage of statutes that transfer
wealth from the populace as a whole (or from other, less politically
powerful groups) make up the demand function in the economic
theory of legislation. The individuals and groups who provide the
funding for these statutes are the suppliers, with legislators serving
as brokers between the groups. But unlike suppliers of goods and
services in market transactions, the suppliers of interest group legis-
lation do not receive anything in exchange for what they are legisla-
tively required to supply. Instead, they are coerced to supply
legislation because of their inability to mount successful opposition
to the groups that are making the demands on the political brokers.
Successful brokers (politicians) "establish an equilibrium" by "ef-
ficiently pairing [these] demanders and suppliers of legislation."5 4
If too much or too little law is passed, it becomes efficient for some
groups to organize into effective political coalitions to remove the
politician/brokers and replace them with ones better able to maxi-
mize political support.55
An important and often overlooked aspect of the economic theory
of regulation holds that politicians do not pander to the demands of
effectively organized special interest groups merely because their
ideologies or personal value judgments favor such groups. Rather,
satisfying the demands of these groups is a matter of Darwinian
political survival. If a politician is not able to satisfy such demands,
he or she will be replaced by one who can.
Thus the premise that politicians pander to interest groups is in
fact a mere tautology under the economic theory of regulation (at
least as it applies to democracies), because the politician who mus-
ters the most political support inevitably triumphs in the democratic
process; the economic theory of regulation simply observes that pol-
iticians who do not rationally maximize political support will be re-
52. See R. POSNER, supra note 15, at 496-99.
53. ToIlison, supra note 13, at 8.
54. Id. at 9.
55. id.
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placed. Politicians who ignore the, preferences of interest groups
that demand regulations in order to pursue their own conception of
the public interest will be unsuccessful in competition against rival
politicians who maximize political support.58
Thus the process of political support maximization in the eco-
nomic theory of legislation is exactly analogous to the process of
profit maximization by private firms in microeconomic theory. Just
as those firms that pursue goals other than profit maximization are
weeded out, so too are those politicians who pursue goals besides
political support maximization.
Another important aspect of being a successful politician is polit-
ical entrepreneurship. According to the economic theory of regula-
tion, being a successful political entrepreneur requires a politician
to do two things that are wholly inconsistent with the older, public-
interest theory of regulation. The first is to seek out issues that ben-
efit small, well-organized groups at the expense of disorganized, ill-
informed voters.57 The second facet of political entrepreneurship
involves actively seeking to identify policy issues that stand to bene-
fit currently unorganized groups of individuals and then organizing
such groups into effective political coalitions that in turn can pro-
vide political support to the politician. Pairing new-found issues
with previously unorganized groups who stand to benefit from such
issues permits politicians to ward off fermenting opposition by more
creative challengers.
The foregoing discussion has been a wholly uncontroversial de-
scription of the economic theory of legislation as it applies to the
ordinary, day-to-day political activities of a democracy. The theory
has found virtually universal support among economists interested
in the operation of the political process. 58 The theory has been
56. Several recent articles have disputed this aspect of the economic theory of regu-
lation by arguing that the personal ideology of the politician, rather than the interests of
well-organized special interest group constituents, can affect the voting behavior of
elected officials. See Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74
AM. ECON. REv. 279 (1984); Kau &: Rubin, SelfInterest Ideology, and Logrolling in Congres-
sional Voting, 22J. L. & ECON. 365 (1979). But see Peltzman, An Economic Interpretation of the
History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 656 (1985) (argu-
ing that ideological influences, when properly measured, exert a negligible effect on
politician voting).
57. See R. McCoRmrc & R. ToLLISON, supra note 35, at 17 (stating that "political
brokers" have incentives to search for issues that result in legislation in which well-
organized groups "gain transfers at the expense of the general public"). Often, a group
will organize to provide a private service to its members and later find that political
action becomes a "cost-effective by-product" of the group's regular activities because
the "start-up costs" of organizing the group have already been borne. Tollison, supra
note 13, at 6; see also Moore, The Purpose ofLicensing, 4J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961) (arguing
that existing interest groups can raise money for lobbying by pricing their services
monopolistically).
58. See Kalt & Zupan, supra note 56, at 279.
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formalized elegantly59 and subjected to rigorous empirical testing.60
Although the economic theory of regulation uses a more complex
model than the one developed by Beard, the differences between
the two approaches are surprisingly small. The distinctions lie only
in the details of the way that the model of regulation is applied: the
models themselves are fundamentally the same.
Beard, like the economists currently writing about the regulatory
process, developed a model of the political process in which the eco-
nomic interests of dominant special interest group coalitions would
be reflected in the law of the land. Beard erred, according to the
dictates of this model, not in his conception of the dominance of
interest groups on the political landscape, but in his understanding
of the precise nature of the interest group dynamic he was attempt-
ing to model.
Beard erroneously thought, for example, that agricultural inter-
ests were being stamped out by the new Constitution. But even the
most casual observers of the current political scene recognize that,
far from being stamped out, agricultural interests have organized
into a myriad of successful interest groups that have achieved mas-
sive wealth transfers for themselves. 61 It is hard to imagine how an
59. The economic theory of regulation is based on the early seminal work in public
choice. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); A. DOWNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); W. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALI-
TIoNs (1962); Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67J. POL ECON. 571 (1959). The clas-
sic work bridging the intellectual gulf between economics and public choice was James
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's, The Calculus of Consent (1962), the enormously impor-
tant book that provides the intellectual underpinnings of the economic theory of regula-
tion.
Other important theoretical work includes M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE Ac-
TION (1965); M. OLSON, supra note 29; and W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESEN-
TATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
The first major piece to apply formal economic theory to regulation was Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. & MGrMr. Smi. 3 (1971), which formalized
the idea that regulation is actively sought by certain industry groups as a means of ac-
quiring a competitive advantage over rivals, which, in turn, leads to profits above the
competitive rate. This model contrasted sharply with earlier work that viewed regula-
tion solely as a source of costs rather than benefits to the regulated group. These costs
were justified as necessary to protect and benefit "the public at large." Id. at 3. Other
major contributions to the economic theory of regulation have been Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976); and Posner, Theo-
ries of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. EcoN. & MGrr. Sci. 335 (1974).
60. See R. MCCORMICK & R. TOLLISON, supra note 35; Bartel & Thomas, Direct and
Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA 's Impact, 28J.L. & ECON. 1 (1985); Coase,
Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 269 (1979); Marvel, Factory
Regulation: A Reinterpretation of Early English Experience, 20 J.L. & ECON. 379 (1977);
Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961); Pashigian, The Effect of Environ-
mental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1984);
Shughart & Tollison, On the Growth of Government and the Political Economy of Legislation, 9
REs. L. & ECON. 111 (1986); Weingast & Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765
(1983).
61. See Kilborn, Plotting a Global Attack Against Farm Subsidies, N.Y. Times, July 12,
1987, § 4, at 2, col. 3 (describing massive government subsidies totalling $25 billion to
all segments of the agriculture industry, including dairy farmers, grain farmers, cotton
farmers, and manufacturers of oilseeds, honey, sugar, tobacco, wool, fruits, and vegeta-
bles). Representative Daniel Glickman, a member of the House Committee on Agricul-
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industry that receives government subsidies comprising $25 billion
(15 percent of the nation's current annual budget deficit) can be
said to be exploited or disenfranchised.6 2 The economic theory of
regulation, by invoking a much better understanding of the underly-
ing interest group dynamic, corrects Beard's erroneous application
of the interest group model as it applies to agricultural interests.63
Beard also erroneously concluded that capitalist banking and
creditor interests inevitably will win out in the political marketplace.
The ability of debtors to seek relief under the insolvency laws, con-
sumer legislation such as truth-in-lending laws, and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act strongly suggest that Beard was also wrong in his no-
don that the market for regulation inevitably favors the bankers.
And the recent struggles of commercial and investment bankers to
undo the shackles of the Glass-Steagall Act also support the notion
that Beard's model of the regulatory market was far too simplistic.
But one key facet of Beard's model remains untouched by the
modem economic theory of regulation, and that is the way that the
Constitution fits into these economic theories. Both sides view the
Constitution as "just another set of rules" that reflect interest group
pressures to the same extent as other laws. The only difference be-
tween the constitutional rules and the garden-variety legal rules lies
in the former's durability, which makes them more valuable to spe-
cial interest groups. According to the economic view of constitu-
tions, "[c]onstitutional provisions are worth more than normal
legislation to interest groups because they are more durable (i.e.,
harder to repeal), but they are also more costly to obtain because of
stricter procedures required for passage." 64
In addition, both economic approaches to the Constitution view
the separation of powers as the cornerstone of the interest group
bargains that the Constitution is said to represent. Beard's view of
the separation of powers was that it slowed the pace of progressive
change and stifled the political expression of the popular will.65
The law and economics movement views the separation of powers as
a mechanism for solving the problem of postcontractual opportu-
nism by legislators. 66
ture, has estimated that abandoning all government subsidies to the agricultural
industry would cause the United States to lose 15% of its farmers. Id.
62. See id.
63. See Posner, supra note 59, at 347 (showing how "economic theory can thus be
used to explain why we so often observe protective legislation in areas like agriculture").
64. Tollison, supra note 13, at 14.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
66. Postcontractual opportunism refers to the problem of contracting parties receiv-
ing the benefits of a contractual bargain in one period and then having an incentive to
renege on the deal or to alter the terms of performance to make them more favorable to
themselves.
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The economists recognize that "[p]erhaps the most basic issue re-
lated to the demand for legislation is to explain why laws persist
over time. That is, why is the work of one legislature not overturned
by the next legislature?" 67 The problem they see is that interest
groups will be unwilling to provide political support in exchange for
favorable legislation if those laws can be repealed in the very next
session.68 Viewed from an ex ante perspective, the prospect of hav-
ing a legislature alter the terms of an interest group political deal
will reduce the political support that interest groups will be willing
to offer in exchange for favorable legislation. Thus legislators who
are interested in maximizing the political support they receive from
constituents have an incentive to construct a system that allows
them to make credible, binding promises to interest groups seeking
legislation.6 9
An important series of economic articles identifies the separation
of powers as the means of solving the dilemma facing political-
support-maximizing legislators.7 0 Specifically, Grain and Tollison
look at the executive veto and conclude that it increases the durabil-
ity of special interest legislation.7 1 Like Beard, Grain and Tollison
view the executive veto as a means of making it more difficult to
repeal a law once it is enacted.2 They also argue that the executive
veto raises the cost of repealing a law by more than it costs to pass a
law in the first place.' 3 This of course increases the durability of the
statutes benefiting interest groups and thereby increases the value
of legislation to such groups.7 4
The other facet of the separation of powers relevant for our pur-
poses is the independent judiciary. William Landes and Richard
Posner have written an extremely influential article in which they
argue that the independent judiciary also serves to increase the
67. Tollison, supra note 13, at 8.
68. See Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 877 (stating that "congressional bad faith
of this sort [i.e., altering interest group bargains after political support has been re-
ceived] would reduce the present value of legislative protection to interest groups in the
future, and hence the enacting Congressmen's welfare").
69. "The price that a winning special-interest group would bid would depend to a
large extent on how durable their legislative protection is expected to be." Grain & Tol-
lison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group Theory of Government, supra note 6, at 558.
70. See supra note 6.
71. See Grain & Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group Theory of Government,
supra note 6, at 560.
72. Id. The executive veto, according to Crain and Tollison, raises the cost of re-
pealing a law. Laws that are harder to repeal are more durable. The problem with this
analysis, of course, is that the executive veto makes laws harder to pass in the first place
for the same reason that it makes them harder to repeal later on. In both cases there is a
nontrivial probability that the President will veto the legislative enactment.
Unless there is some reason (Crain and Tollison offer none) why it is more likely that
the President will veto a repeal of a law than an initial enactment, Crain and Tollison's
own analysis suggests that the executive veto raises rather than lowers the cost to an
interest group of achieving legislation favorable to itself.
73. Id.
74. "Given a rational pattern of investment in the durability-enhancing aspects of
democratic decision making, the executive veto, along with the constitutive rules of the
legislature and the independent judiciary, acts to increase the durability of special-
interest legislation." Id.
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durability of special interest legislation. 75 The Landes and Posner
argument is, as the authors themselves admit, highly coun-
terintuitive.7 6 Their argument is that, despite the fact that the exist-
ence of an independent judiciary seems to be designed to thwart the
operation of interest groups,"7 "at a deeper level the independent
judiciary is not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-
group theory of government"7 8 because it prevents special interest
group bargains from being thwarted by subsequent legislatures:
The element of stability or continuity necessary to enable interest-
group politics to operate in the legislative arena is supplied, in the
first instance, by the procedural rules of the legislature, and in the
second instance by the existence of an independent judiciary.79
Like Grain and Tollison, Landes and Posner argue that the costs to
interest groups of the separation of powers (namely that the separa-
tion makes it harder for interest groups to achieve the initial passage
of legislation that is favorable to them) is outweighed by the gains,
which come in the form of increased durability.8 0
Taken together, the Landes/Posner and Grain/Tollison articles
75. See Landes & Posner, supra note 6.
76. They write:
The existence of an independent judiciary seems inconsistent with - in fact
profoundly threatening to - a political system in which public policy
emerges from the struggle of interest groups to redistribute the wealth of
the society in their favor, the view of the political process that underlies
much of the recent economic work . . . on the political system. The
outcomes of the [interest group] struggle can readily be nullified by unsym-
pathetic judges - and why should judges be sympathetic to a process that
simply ratifies political power rather than expresses principle?
id. at 876.
77. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
78. Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 877.
79. rd. at 878.
For many individual Congressmen ... especially those who did not expect to
remain in Congress for long, the benefits from repudiating a previous Con-
gress' "deal" might outweigh the costs. And even if the good faith of the
majority of Congressmen were assured, it would be insufficient to guarantee
legislative stability in any case where the initial vote enacting the legislation
was not one sided. If the [initial] vote was close, the defection of only a few
Congressmen, as a result of retirement or defeat at the polls, from the win-
ning coalition might lead to a repeal in the next session of Congress, since
the newly elected Congressmen would have no commitments to honor the
"deals" of their predecessors.
80. Id. at 878-79:
The impediments to legislation have the effect of endowing legislation, once
it is enacted, with a measure of durability. The result is to increase the value
of and hence the demand for legislation.... [U]nder plausible assumptions
the increase in the value of legislation will exceed the increase in its cost,
since a modest increase in the cost of enacting legislation could multiply
many-fold the length of the period in which the legislation was expected to
remain in force.
id.
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present a unified picture of the current economic approach to the
Constitution's separation of powers.81 As Crain and Tollison them-
selves observe, this vision of the Constitution "in effect undermines
any semblance of a separation-of-powers argument in favor of our
tripartite system of government. If our approach and that of Landes
and Posner is correct, we have not a separation but a collusion of
powers in our governmental system." '8 2
At the core of the economic approach to the separation of powers
is the idea that interest group legislation inevitably will be unsuc-
cessful in the absence of checks and balances that serve to ensure
the durability of such legislation.8 3 This idea, however, is based on
the erroneous assumption that there are no repeated dealings be-
tween the interest groups seeking wealth transfers and the politi-
cians who procure the supply.8 4 If there is the practical equivalence
of simultaneity of performance in the form of repeat dealings, then
the durability of special interest deals is ensured because legislators
have an incentive to keep their end of the deal in order to obtain
political support from interest groups in the future.
Thus if politicians want interest group support they must con-
tinue to support such groups. The current economic approaches to
the Constitution are flawed because they envision a world in which
political support to legislators from political coalitions is needed
only in advance of political action by legislators. But this premise
conflicts with a core premise of the economic theory of regulation,
which posits that interest group bargains are brokered by politicians
who must maximize political support from interest groups in order
to win reelection.8 5 Absent a continuing need to maximize political
support, the model has no theory to predict why lawmakers do
anything.
If politicians are seeking reelection, then interest groups will be
assured that the statutes that have been passed to benefit them will
not be repealed. If such statutes are repealed, then the interest
groups will withdraw their political support from those politicians
who voted for the repeal. The persistent need for political support
by elected officials seeking reelection is sufficient to ensure the fu-
ture performance of interest group political bargains. There is no
need for outside enforcement through such costly devices as an in-
dependent judiciary where there is simultaneity of performance be-
tween interest groups and politicians.86 Put another way, politicians
generally support statutes because interest groups are promising to
81. Indeed, the purpose of the article by Crain and Tollison, which followed the
paper by Landes and Posner, was to complete "the task that Landes and Posner
started." Grain & Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-Group Theory of Government,
supra note 6, at 561.
82. Id.
83. Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 877 (stating that "the independent judiciary is
not only consistent with, but essential to, the interest-group theory of government").
84. See id. at 879.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
86. See Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521, 527
(1981).
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support them in their future political campaigns. From this per-
spective the problem is not preventing the politician from reneging
on his bargain with the interest group, but rather ensuring that the
interest group will not renege on the politician.
Relations between politicians and interest groups are character-
ized by a pattern of repeat dealings; politicians expect to strike fu-
ture bargains with interest groups. This provides a strong
disincentive for politicians to renege on past political deals. The
value of their future promises is diminished if they do not honor
past agreements.
A further reason why politicians do not renege on their deals,
which again has nothing to do with the presence of an independent
judiciary or the existence of an executive veto, is that over time poli-
ticians develop a reservoir of human capital in their reputations for
behaving in certain ways. A politician's reputation as a "liberal" or
a "conservative" is a reputational bond that serves to bind him to
his promises to honor his agreements. If reneging on a deal with an
interest group would cost a politician more in loss of reputational
capital then he stands to gain from a postcontractual breach, he can
be counted on not to renege.
Finally, it must be stressed that, all else being equal, politicians
will prefer to write self-enforcing contracts because interest groups
will adjust the level of political support according to the expected
costs of enforcing the legislation they procure. If a group believes
costly litigation is required to obtain the benefits of a legislative bar-
gain, it will reduce the price it is willing to pay for such legislation
accordingly.
Thus, contrary to the Landes/Posner and Crain/Tollison view,
the presence of such elements of the system of checks and balances
as the separation of powers, the executive veto, and the independ-
entjudidary are not "essential to" the interest group theory of gov-
ernment.8 7 Several other contracting mechanisms exist to ensure
the durability of interest group legislation.
The current economic view of the separation of powers has an
additional flaw: it does not explain why presidents and judges have
any rational incentive to act as the enforcers of the contracts between
special interest groups and legislators. According to the theory, the
executive and thejudiciary receive no pecuniary gain from enforc-
ing these agreements - a particularly bizarre premise in light of the
fact that the executive, like members of Congress, has a strong in-
centive to maximize his own political support. It is impossible to
imagine why the President does not extract additional political sup-
port for himself from interest groups with a national base in ex-
87. See supra note 83.
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change for his agreement to decline to veto a particular statute.
And if the executive does extract political support from interest
groups (as the economic theory of regulation predicts he must), 8
then the presence of the executive veto as part of the separation of
powers raises rather than lowers the cost to interest groups of achiev-
ing passage of favorable legislation.
The role played by the independent judiciary is even more curi-
ous. Federal judges have life tenure, and their salaries cannot be
reduced during their terms of office. They are insulated from the
political incentives that cause politicians to maximize political
support. As such, it is difficult to predict the nature of the incentives
to which judges are likely to respond. In light of the fact that Article
III judges cannot affect their wealth by deciding cases in particular
ways or by favoring certain groups, it seems plausible that some
judges will decide cases so as to maximize their prestige with certain
constituents, such as liberals, conservatives, or academics. Other
judges will care little for prestige and simply maximize their leisure
time. Still other judges will decide cases so as to impose their own
values - their own personal vision of the good - upon society.
Judges simply have no incentive to substitute the enforcement of a
set of bargains between interest groups and legislators for their own
set of preferences regarding the outcome of a case.
As I have explained elsewhere, the ability ofjudges to thwart the
bargains struck between interest groups and Congress appears to be
highly inconsistent with the interest group theory of government.8 9
The cost to interest groups of having a system of checks and bal-
ances, combined with the simultaneity of performance between
those demanding interest group bargains and those supplying them,
inevitably leads one to the conclusion that the current economic
paradigm is wrong and that the separation of powers impedes rather
than facilitates interest group rent-seeking activity.
In sum, the heart of both the Beardian approach and the law and
economics approach is that the Constitution is an economic docu-
ment designed to facilitate the transfer of wealth from the populace
at large to discrete, well-organized special interest groups. Both
models of the Constitution reflect the standard economic premise
88. See supra text accompanying note 56.
89. See Macey, supra note 7. The most obvious method for courts to thwart an inter-
est group's political deal with Congress is to declare the statute that reflects the interest
group's half of the deal unconstitutional. But there are myriad other ways for an in-
dependent judiciary to thwart such deals. The Supreme Court might simply decline to
grant certiorari in cases where lower courts have abrogated interest group bargains. In
addition, courts at all levels can thwart interest group bargains intentionally and unin-
tentionally by misconstruing the relevant statute.
Such "creative" interpretation of statutes by courts has an effect on the levels of polit-
ical support that interest groups are willing to offer to politicians. As the probability of a
particular law being declared unconstitutional or misconstrued increases, the value of
that law to political coalitions declines proportionately. This decline in value quickly will
be reflected in a decline in the willingness of interest groups to pay for such legislation.
The fact that creative judicial interpretations are roundly criticized by congressmen of
all political stripes provides evidence that it has an effect on levels of political support
from interest groups.
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that the Framers were self-interested individuals rationally respond-
ing to economic incentives by pursuing their own, selfish goals as
opposed to worrying about the general welfare of the country. And,
again reflecting standard economic analysis, the pursuit of one's
self-interest to attain economic goals outside of the market, where
consent is required in order for transactions to take place, led to a
Constitution designed to facilitate pernicious wealth transfers,
rather than to facilitate the economic stability conducive to wealth
creation.
These twin economic visions of the Constitution contrast sharply
with the dominant vision of that document within the rest of Ameri-
can intellectual life. Starting with Gordon Wood,90 the prevailing
vision of the Constitution has been that it is a "political device
designed to control the social forces the Revolution had re-
leased." 9 ' And, as Cass Sunstein has observed, the prohibition of
the distribution of resources to powerful, economic special interests
is "the most promising candidate for a unitary theory of the Consti-
tution."' 92 The question addressed in the next and final section of
this Article is whether these widely held, public-regarding - but
noneconomic - visions of the Constitution can be reconciled with
the principles of economic theory.
III. An Alternative Economic Approach to the Constitution
Clearly, rent seeking is widespread in ordinary political life. In-
deed, the interest group model of political behavior, as it was de-
scribed above, is an incredibly robust model for predicting both the
behavior of politicians and bureaucrats and the outcomes generated
by the political process. But merely because we observe rent-seeking
behavior by politicians and interest groups during ordinary political
life does not mean that the Constitution was designed to promote
this sort of transfer activity.93 Interest group transfer activity is an
inevitable by-product of rational, self-interested behavior in a de-
mocracy. It is not possible even to reduce much less eliminate the
90. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 393-476
(1969)..
91. Id at 476.
92. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1732. Obviously, the Framers themselves stated that
their objective was to ensure against the capture of government by interest groups bent
on effecting unprincipled wealth redistributions. See THE FEDERAUST Nos. 10 (J.
Madison), 51 (1. Madison) & 78 (A. Hamilton); see also D. EPSTEIN, THE POLIICAL THE-
ORY OF T FEDERALIST 5-7, 94-110 (1984) (examining the causes, effects, and control of
factions discussed by Madison); G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 80-86,
210-15 (1981) (discussing Madison's concerns with the problems presented by factions).
But there is no reason to believe the Framers should be taken at their word when they
say that they designed the Constitution to benefit the new Republic rather than
themselves.
93. See Macey, supra note 7, at 245-46.
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incidence of such activity without cost. Resources can be rationally
expended to reduce wealth transfers only up to the point at which
the benefit from the reduction in transfers equals the cost of achiev-
ing the reduction.9 4 Thus the fact that we observe wealth transfers
does not dispose of the question whether the Constitution, as an
economic document, was designed to facilitate or to impede such
transfers.95 To answer this question we must examine the economic
incentives facing constitutional drafters.
The existing economic visions of the Constitution reflect the be-
lief that the Framers wanted to benefit themselves by consolidating
political power in a new central government that in turn would be
able to protect their interests (Beard's view) or to effectuate wealth
transfers in order to garner political support for themselves
(Grain/Tollison and Landes/Posner's view).
Both of these arguments make the erroneous presumption that in
constitutional politics, interest groups will prefer a system of gov-
ernment that promotes wealth-transfer activity. At the outset, it is
important to note the difference between constitutions and ordinary
statutes. Unlike ordinary legislation, constitutions do not effectuate
isolated wealth transfers from one group to another. Rather, consti-
tutions, in establishing the structure of government, establish the
procedures that interest groups must follow in order to obtain pas-
sage of the laws they favor. The nature of these procedures deter-
mines the level of transaction costs that interest groups face when
attempting to achieve passage of a law. The higher the level of
transaction costs at the constitutional level, the more costly it is for
an interest group coalition to obtain favorable legislation.
To put the point in slightly more formal terms, as the structural
rules of a constitution change, the supply curve of legislation shifts.
These structural rules include the size of the legislature, the pres-
ence or absence of a bicameral legislature, the existence of an in-
dependent judiciary, the length of legislative sessions, the rules
regarding politicians' ability to succeed themselves, and the nature
of the constituents of the various elected officials, among others. 96
As passing statutes becomes more costly, the supply curve moves
towards the origin, reflecting the fact that at every level of political
support, interest groups receive less legislation.9 7
94. See id at 246.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 247-48 (describing some of these structural rules and explaining how
they raise the costs to interest group coalitions of obtaining legislation); see also J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 59, at 43, 233-48 (same); R. MCCORMICK & R.
ToLLIsoN, supra note 35, at 45-57 (same).
97. See Tollison, supra note 13, at 8. For example, if a nation with a unicameral
legislature amends its constitution to provide for a bicameral legislature, with a house
and a senate of differing sizes, the supply curve for legislation will shift inward towards
the origin, reflecting the fact that legislation has become more costly to obtain. See Ma-
cey, supra note 7, at 247-48; see alsoJ. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 59, at 43, 233-
48 (analyzing how a bicameral legislature operates in the context of collective decision-
making mad how this impacts on the cost analysis of special interest groups); R. McCoR-
MICK & R. TOLLISON, supra note 35, at 45-57 (discussing how the size and ratio of the
respective legislative houses affect costs to interest groups).
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The crucial distinction between constitutional rules and ordinary
legal rules seems to have been lost on the economists who have
evaluated the Constitution. This distinction is crucial because it al-
ters the incentives facing special interest groups during times of
constitutional creation. Special interest groups that have an incen-
tive to press for specific wealth transfers for themselves also have an
incentive to expend resources to avoid wealth transfers from them-
selves to other groups. Unfortunately, in ordinary political life,
free-rider problems prevent coalitions of individual special interest
groups from banding together to prevent other groups from ob-
taining wealth transfers for themselves. Since most groups expect
to be net losers from a pervasive system of special interest group








*Measured by level of political support needed for passage of a statute.
The supply curve labeled SI reflects the political support maximization equilibrium
for the nation with the unicameral legislature. The shift to supply curve S2 reflects the
lower level of regulation that comes when the country shifts to a bicameral legislative
system. A lower level of output of interest group legislation comes from this constitu-
tional change because each house effectively can veto the act of the other house, thus
raising the level of political support necessary to achieve enactment of any given law.
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tional rules that raise the costs of rent seeking generally - even if
doing so means forgoing a certain measure of favorable legislation
later on. The costs of giving up this favorable legislation are out-
weighed by the benefits of being protected from the expense of pay-
ing for the wealth transfers that go to others.
Although a small number of groups will expect to be net winners
from the wealth transfers that will take place in Congress after a new
constitution is enacted, such groups will not necessarily oppose con-
stitutional rules that inhibit rent seeking. Because rent seeking by
interest groups is a negative-sum game,98 gains from trade between
future providers of political favors and future recipients of such fa-
vors exist at the time of constitutional creation.
A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose a particular
group (group "X") thinks that it will receive a total of $1,000 in
wealth transfers if Constitution A is adopted, but only $250 if Con-
stitution B is adopted. This interest group will find it advantageous
to support Constitution B if it receives any sum above $750 for do-
ing so. Because other groups recognize that the additional $750 in
wealth transfers under Constitution A will cost them more than
$750, and group X recognizes that it will have to incur costs in the
future to obtain the additional $750, there will be gains from trade
between these groups that provide them with incentives to adopt
Constitution B, which inhibits rent seeking.
Thus the current presumption of the Beardians and the
Crain/Tollison and Landes/Posner school that interest groups inev-
itably have an incentive to support constitutions that promote rent
seeking is erroneous. In fact, the opposite appears to be true.
Groups and individuals who expect to be net losers in the wealth
transfer game have incentives to strike bargains - which will be re-
flected in constitutional rules - in which they agree to refrain from
rent seeking in exchange for promises from other groups that they,
too, will refrain from rent seeking. And groups that expect to be net
winners in the wealth transfer game have incentives to give up the
right to seek future transfers in exchange for immediate wealth
transfers that permit all groups to share in the gains that accrue
from halting the dead-weight societal losses that come from rent
seeking.
By ignoring the gains that result from contracting among interest
groups at the time of constitutional creation, the current economic
approaches to the Constitution fail to recognize the &conomic in-
centives that can make constitutions different from other forms of
98. Rent seeking is a negative-sum game as opposed to a simple wealth transfer
because the costs of obtaining favorable legislation are positive. Such costs include the
costs of organizing into effective political coalitions, the costs of providing political sup-
port to sympathetic politicians, the costs of providing political support to the opponents
of unsympathetic politicians, the costs of imposing sanctions on noncooperative group
members, the costs of complying with regulations, and the opportunity costs of having
resources diverted to less valuable, but unregulated, uses. See McChesney, supra note
32, at 118. See generally, Posner, supra note 36; Rogerson, The Social Costs of Monopoly and
Regulation: A Game Theoretic Analysis, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 391 (1982); Tullock, supra note 36.
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law. These approaches also underestimate the possibilities of con-
stitutional ordering. But merely because the various parties in-
volved in the process of constitutional creation recognize that they
stand to gain by drafting a constitution that impedes rent seeking
does not mean that they will be successful in drafting such a consti-
tution. Just as various groups have an incentive to draft a constitu-
tion that impedes rent seeking, such groups also have incentives to
breach the agreement by seeking wealth transfers after the constitu-
tion is enacted.
In other words, after the constitution has been enacted, all of the
individuals and interest groups within a society are in a classic pris-
oner's dilemma in relation to one another.99 Although everybody
would be better off if an enforceable agreement to constrain rent
seeking could be achieved, individual interest groups can make
themselves better off if they engage in rent seeking, provided of
course that nobody else does. Thus the dominant strategy after a
constitution has been created is to engage in rent seeking. This al-
lows an interest group to avoid the worst possible outcome (which
occurs if all other groups engage in rent seeking and it does not)
while leaving open the possibility that it will enjoy the best possible
outcome (which occurs if all other groups in society refrain from
rent seeking except that group).
In order to mitigate the effects of the prisoner's dilemma, the vari-
ous interest groups participating in the creation of the constitution
must be able to draft a document that prevents such postconstitu-
tional opportunism from taking place. Mere promises are not
enough. The world is replete with constitutions (those in South
America and the Soviet Union are obvious examples) that contain
99. Game theorists use the term "prisoner's dilemma" to describe situations in
which the inability of individuals to coordinate their decisions leads to a suboptimal
result, when viewed from the decisionmaker's perspective.
The term arises from a game-theoretic analysis of the decisional problems facing twoprisoners who are the subject of separate interrogations for committing a crime to-
gether. Each prisoner knows that if neither confesses or informs on his copartner, each
will go free or enjoy a significantly reduced sentence. However, if one prisoner con.
fesses to the crime and the other does not, the authorities will impose a particularly
severe sentence on the prisoner who declined to confess and a particularly light sen-
tence on the prisoner who "squealed." If both confess, both will be punished, but less
severely than if only one prisoner confessed. The incentive for the rational actor is to
confess on the hope that the other prisoner wil refuse to confess. But since both pris-
oners will be motivated to act this way, they will end up with an outcome that is worse
for both than if they had been able to coordinate their actions by making a binding cc
ante agreement between themselves to decline to confess. The model is designed to
show that rational, self-interested behavior at the individual level can lead to irrational
outcomes at the group level. See THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 352 (rev. ed.
1983).
For a more formal description of the prisoner's-dilemma game, see P. SAMUELSON &
W. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS app. 556-57 (12th ed. 1985); P. ARANSON, AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE 56-58 (1981).
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myriad promises to individuals and groups that seemingly protect
them from incursions by government. Such documents have not
provided any discernible protection. By contrast, as Buchanan and
Tullock have shown in their classic book, The Calculus of Consent, dif-
ferent organizational structures inevitably lead to different supply
curves for legislation.100
These structural rules constitute the basis for a credible constitu-
tional method of constraining rent seeking. Indeed, the structure of
the United States Constitution indicates that the document was
designed to impede the flow of legislative output to interest groups.
The bicameral legislature, the executive veto, and the independent
judiciary all are designed to impede rather than facilitate rent seek-
ing by interest groups.10 1
Thus far, two necessary preconditions for a public-regarding con-
stitution have been identified. The first is that the relevant interest
groups be aware of the costs and benefits of postconstitutional rent
seeking so that they have an incentive to design a constitution that
impedes such behavior by interest groups. The second precondi-
tion is that the interest groups have the technical ability to prepare a
constitution that minimizes the costs associated with the prisoner's
dilemma that faces the citizenry of the postconstitutional world.
The final precondition for the creation of a constitution that im-
pedes rather than facilitates rent seeking is the existence of a polit-
ical climate where the preferences of the polity (precondition one)
and their constitutional technology (precondition two) can find ex-
pression. This third condition requires that those groups within the
population as a whole who have a possibility of being net losers in
the wealth transfer game be included in the process of constitutional
formation. Future losers must be included in the creation of the new
constitution in order to ensure that the interests of those people
with incentives to block future wealth transfers find political expres-
sion. Obviously, if such groups are not included in the political pro-
cess, then regardless of how high their stakes are in the outcome or
how sophisticated their contracting mechanisms, their interests will
not be reflected in the constitution.
These three preconditions to the adoption of a publicly interested
constitution - high stakes, sufficiently sophisticated contracting
technology, and the inclusion of losing coalitions in the process of
constitutional formation - were all present during the formation of
the American Constitution. The stakes were high because the Fram-
ers were not merely creating a document that would change the
rules of the game for an already existing political infrastructure, as is
the case with the vast majority of world constitutions. 10 2 In America
the ratification of the new Constitution created an entirely new fed-
100. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLocK, supra note 59, at 119-262.
101. See Macey, supra note 7, at 247-50.
102. The French Revolution, for example, did not create a new nation; it merely re-
constituted the old one.
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eral republic, largely in order to provide an alternative to the system
of state charters and constitutions that existed before 1787.
As a general matter, citizens will have little incentive to inform
themselves of the nature of the various statutes passed in the ordi-
nary course of a legislative session because the cost of such legisla-
tion is lower than the cost of acquiring such information. And even
if the costs of acquiring information about a proposed statute are
low relative to the effects of the statute, the cost of organizing an
effective political coalition to oppose such a statute is sufficiently
high that expending resources to discover the economic effects of
ordinary laws remains irrational for ordinary citizens. This cost-
benefit calculus changes dramatically when constitutional rules are
being considered, because the impact of constitutional rules is much
higher than the impact of ordinary laws. Such rules will determine
the ability of government to affect all of a citizen's present and fu-
ture wealth. As McCormick and Tollison have observed:
[W]e would expect the citizen-consumer-taxpayer to play a larger
role in constitutional processes than in normal political processes
... [because] the individual voter's stake is ... larger when con-
sidering constitutional issues. At the relevant margins of behav-
ior, then, we expect more voter impact on constitutions than on
regular elections.103
Thus, the first precondition for the creation of a public-regarding
constitution seems to have been in place at the time of the creation
of the American Constitution. The next two preconditions laid the
groundwork for the American Constitution to take its unique place
in world history. 10 4
The contracting expertise that enabled the Framers to construct a
document that could, at least to some extent, satisfy the second pre-
condition came from two sources. First, the various state constitu-
tions, which "foreshadowed . . . the basic premises of the
Constitution,"' 0 5 served as veritable laboratories where alternative
constitutional formulations could be tried out. Ineffective contrac-
tual provisions were discarded and useful ones were incorporated
into the new Constitution. Indeed, as Gordon Wood has observed,
the dismal experiences of many state legislatures in controlling the
pernicious effects of interest groups was one of the motivating
forces for the creation of a federal constitution. 10 6
In addition to this information about the efficacy of the various
state constitutions, the Framers had available John Adams's classic
work, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
103. R. McCoIwicm & R. ToLLISON, supra note 35, at 127.
104. See supra note 1.
105. See Kristol, supra note 1, at 6.
106. See G. WOOD, supra note 90, at 273-82.
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America, which is nothing less than an annotated analysis of the oper-
ation of all of the various republics that existed throughout world
history. This resource also provided valuable data to the Framers
about the desirability of various constitutional formulations.
Perhaps more important than even this wealth of practical infor-
mation, the Framers, for the first time in world history, had the
teachings of "[t]he new political science, based on such constitution-
alists as Locke, Hume, and Montesquieu"' 10 7 at their disposal.
These thinkers were the intellectual inspiration for the Framers.
Their views are reflected throughout the Federalist papers and in the
Constitution itself. Also important was their idea that human virtue
could not be relied upon to guide a republic because both the politi-
cians and the polity could be expected to put their own self-interest
above the interests of the greater good. In addition, the justifica-
tions for the separation of powers that provide the structural under-
pinnings of the Constitution "find their most complete expression
in Montesquieu."' 08 But perhaps most important are the twin ideas
that a community can improve its lot by constraining itself through
the device of the social contract and that the state can serve the peo-
ple best by specifying and enforcing a set of property rights so as to
maximize societal output. 10 9
The contributions of these social philosophers, as well as of the
thinkings of such men as Adam Smith'1 0 and Thomas Hobbes," l '
provided the Framers with the expertise necessary to construct a
constitution that could mitigate the effects of the prisoner's dilemma
facing citizens in the postconstitutional world.1 12 These protections
107. Mansfield, Constitutional Government. The Soul of Modern Democracy, PuB. INTEREST,
Winter 1987, at 53, 57.
108. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REv. 1, 2 (1982).
109. See Berns, The New Pursuit of Happiness, PuB. INTEREST, Winter 1987, at 65.
Writes Berns:
From Locke, "America's philosopher," as he used to be called, the Framers
learned how to channel the passions and energies of men into safe activi-
ties.... [T]he government that secures the right to pursue happiness will be
the one that, to the extent possible, leaves men alone to do what they are
inclined to do. And according to Locke, they are naturally and primarily in-
dined to seek the "conveniences and comforts of Life."
Id. at 73.
According to Locke, this inclination to seek the conveniences and comforts of life is
derived from man's strongest innate desire - the desire for self-preservation. It is this
innate desire that obliges government to protect the right to acquire property in order
to obtain these conveniences and comforts. See id.
110. See id. at 72 (describing Smith as the "immediate source" of the Federalist's no-
tion that the goal of providing for" '[tihe prosperity of commerce.., is now perceived
and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most
productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a primary object of
their political cares'" (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 12, at 73, 73 (A. Hamilton) (.
Cooke ed. 1961))).
111. See id. at 68-69 (stating that "it was Hobbes who first began to speak of the rights
of man and, by doing so, changed the terms of American political discourse").
112. The nature of the contracting devices is of course a subject worthy of a discus-
sion of its own. See Macey, supra note 7, at 247-50 (describing how the structure of the
Constitution supports the conclusion that the document is designed "to favor the gen-
eral polity over special interest groups"); see also Macey, Transaction Costs and the Nor-
mative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory
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come not in the form of empty assurances and precatory language
but in the organizational structure of the government that the docu-
ment creates." 13
The third precondition to successful constitutional formation is
that those who are likely to be the losers in future rent-seeking activ-
ities be included in the process of constitutional formation. As dis-
cussed above, the wealth transfers generated by the political process
are likely to come from widely dispersed and unorganized individ-
uals. In turn, these transfers are likely to be directed towards small,
discrete, well-organized interest groups. As such, for the final pre-
condition to be satisfied, it is necessary for the widely dispersed, un-
organized groups and individuals within society to become
interested and engaged in the process of constitutional formation.
In the United States experience, the goal of getting the disorga-
nized general population to become engaged in the process of con-
stitutional formation was achieved by requiring that the new
Constitution "be submitted to the people themselves" and recognizing
that "the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it
for ever." 114 Since there was a realistic doubt about the desirability
of a new national government, this submission to the people was not
an empty gesture. Indeed, the Federalist papers themselves were
written for the express purpose of persuading the general public
(particularly the crucial New York ratifying convention) to vote for
the Constitution."15
Thus, to use Douglass North's terminology, at the time of the rati-
fication debates, the governmental vision that the Framers were at-
tempting to advance faced real competition. The existence of this
rival governmental framework was a source of power to those in
possession of the franchise at the time of ratification. 116 It permit-
ted them to consider and select - in the presence of a realistic alter-
native - the governmental framework that was best for them. The
high stakes ensured that they would have an incentive to invest the
resources necessary to acquire sufficient information to make a ra-
tional selection. Thus the economic theory of the Constitution that I
am presenting does not posit that the Constitution is perfect, only
(manuscript to be published in 74 VA. L. REv. (1988)) (copy on file at the George Jvashing-
ton Law Review) (describing structural improvements that could be made on the constitu-
tional provisions that impede interests groups, rent-seeking activities).
113. See Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, supra note 112.
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 253, 258, 265-66 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
115. Lavine, supra note 5, at 53-54.
116. North, supra note 38, at 255 ("Where there are no close substitutes, an existing
ruler will be characterized as a despot, a dictator, or an absolute monarch. The closer
the substitutes, the fewer degrees of freedom the ruler possesses, and the greater the
percentage of incremental income that will be retained by the constituents.").
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that it was better than the available alternatives on the basis of the
political science technology existing at the time.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to show that it is useful to
look at the creation of the American Constitution from an economic
perspective, and that a dispassionate view of its creation need not
end inevitably in the dour conclusions currently manifested in the
literature. Indeed, the current economic approaches, by failing to
fully understand the incentives facing the Framers, have generated
an economic theory of the Constitution that leads to fundamental
misunderstandings of the nature and purposes of that document.
I wish to emphasize that the purpose of this exercise has not been
to show that constitutional rules irevitably will be more public-re-
garding than ordinary rules. Rather, it has been to show that under
certain preconditions the potential for social and economic progress
through constitutional creation are enormous. And the available ev-
idence indicates that these preconditions were obtained during the
time of the creation of the American Constitution.
The approach taken in this Article has been explicitly economic in
the sense that the Constitution itself is explicitly economic. The
analysis here has proceeded on the assumption that the significance
of the Constitution stems not from the inherent goodness and virtue
of the drafters of that document, but rather from the nature of the
incentives that guided their actions and those of the "conventions of
the people" responsible for its ratification.
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